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Neurons in prefrontal cortex (PFC) encode rules,
goals, and other abstract information thought to un-
derlie cognitive, emotional, and behavioral flexibility.
Here we show that the amygdala, a brain area tradi-
tionally thought to mediate emotions, also encodes
abstract information that could underlie this flexi-
bility. Monkeys performed a task in which stimulus-
reinforcement contingencies varied between two
sets of associations, each defining a context. Rein-
forcement prediction required identifying a stimulus
and knowing the current context. Behavioral evi-
dence indicated that monkeys utilized this informa-
tion to perform inference and adjust their behavior.
Neural representations in both amygdala and PFC
reflected the linked sets of associations implicitly
defining each context, a process requiring a level
of abstraction characteristic of cognitive opera-
tions. Surprisingly, when errors were made, the con-
text signal weakened substantially in the amygdala.
These data emphasize the importance of maintaining
abstract cognitive information in the amygdala to
support flexible behavior.
INTRODUCTION
Sensory stimuli can elicit cognitive, physiological and behav-
ioral responses that reflect a subject’s emotional state. This
capacity can be acquired through conditioning procedures in
which a subject learns that a particular sensory cue predicts
a rewarding or aversive event (LeDoux, 2000; Schultz, 2006).
Subjects can later learn to inhibit responses to the same stim-
ulus through extinction (Milad and Quirk, 2012) or to alter re-
sponses to the stimulus if its associated reinforcement changes
in value (Pickens and Holland, 2004). However, subjects can
also regulate emotional responses to stimuli flexibly by using
cognitive operations. Consider the game of Blackjack. Here,being dealt the same card, such as a king, can cause joy in
one hand, if a player makes ‘‘21,’’ and distress in another
hand because the player goes bust. Players apply the rules
of the game to regulate their emotional responses instanta-
neously upon seeing the king. Re-learning of stimulus-outcome
associations need not occur to adjust responses. This flexible
behavior exemplifies the cognitive control of emotion (Ochsner
and Gross, 2005).
In this study, we investigated mechanisms relevant to the
cognitive control of emotion by training monkeys to perform
a task in which a cognitive strategy can be used to predict
reinforcement more efficiently. Monkeys performed a serial
reversal trace-conditioning task. In every block of trials, one
conditioned stimulus (CS) predicted reward (unconditioned
stimulus [US]), and another CS did not. Both CSs switched rein-
forcement contingencies simultaneously upon block changes,
and the two types of blocks reversed many times in every
experiment.
We defined a context in each experiment as the block of trials
in which a particular set of stimulus-outcome contingencies is in
effect. Context thereby parallels ‘‘task set’’ (Sakai, 2008) (i.e., the
set of associations characterizing a block of trials). On 40% of
trials, the context was signaled by a contextual cue, but on
the other 60% of trials, context information was not explicitly
presented and instead had to be represented internally as a
cognitive variable.
In principle, monkeys could perform this task by learning each
CS-US contingency independently after every block switch, a
strategy that does not rely on information about context. How-
ever, monkeys’ behavioral performance indicated that they
abstracted a representation of context to perform the task
more efficiently. After a block switch, upon experiencing one
CS as having switched its contingency, monkeys adjusted their
behavior on the first trial of the other CS even when it was not
accompanied by a contextual cue and even though the new con-
tingency for that CS had yet to be experienced. This indicates
that monkeys use a representation of context to infer what rein-
forcement to expect. Since the context is un-cued when mon-
keys display inference, we refer to it as a ‘‘cognitive context.’’
Many studies have established that the amygdala participates
in learning and representing the relationship between sensoryNeuron 87, 869–881, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 869
Figure 1. Task Design and Example Licking
Behavior
(A) Task design (see Experimental Procedures).
(B) Licking rate (defined as the proportion of time
spent licking during the last 500 ms of the trace
interval) as a function of trial number throughout an
example experimental session. CS1 is paired with
reward in Context 1 and paired with no reward in
Context 2. Block transitions are indicated by ver-
tical dashed lines, and the context in effect for
each block is indicated by the diagram in (A).stimuli and upcoming reinforcement to direct behavioral and
physiological expressions of emotional state (Ambroggi et al.,
2008; Baxter and Murray, 2002; Carelli et al., 2003; Everitt
et al., 2003; LeDoux, 2000; Paton et al., 2006; Quirk et al.,
1995; Salzman and Fusi, 2010; Schoenbaum et al., 1998; Shabel
and Janak, 2009; Tye et al., 2008). These studies indicate that the
amygdala coordinates emotional responses, but the critical
cognitive processing thought to underlie emotional flexibility is
conventionally predicated to lie in the pre-frontal cortex (PFC).
The PFC has been shown to encode rules and other abstract in-
formation (Buckley et al., 2009; Durstewitz et al., 2010; Salzman
and Fusi, 2010; Stokes et al., 2013; Wallis et al., 2001). Further-
more, it has been proposed that a component of the PFC—orbi-
tofrontal cortex—represents ‘‘cognitive maps’’ of task space, a
type of representation that could be important for the implemen-
tation of reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms and flexible deci-
sion making (Wilson et al., 2014).
The demonstration that monkeys utilize knowledge of a cogni-
tive context to infer upcoming reinforcement afforded us the op-
portunity to study the neurophysiological processes that could
mediate this flexible behavior. While monkeys performed the
task, we recorded the activity of single neurons in the amygdala
and the two parts of the PFC most densely interconnected with
the amygdala, the anterior cingulate (ACC) and orbitofrontal
cortices (OFCs) (Ghashghaei et al., 2007; Stefanacci and Amaral,
2000). Neural activity in the amygdala encoded abstract informa-
tion about context even when it was not cued by sensory stimuli.
This signal reflected the linked sets of CS-US associations
defining each context, a process requiring the cognitive abstrac-
tion and internalization of an unobservable variable. Activity in
OFC and ACC also represented cognitive (i.e., un-cued) context.
In all three brain areas, the context signal was present when
monkeys utilized inference. Notably, when monkeys’ behavioral
responses did not anticipate reward accurately, the context rep-
resentation weakened substantially in the amygdala. The main-
tenance of abstract cognitive information in the amygdala may
therefore be a signature of successful flexible behavior on this
task.870 Neuron 87, 869–881, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.RESULTS
Two rhesus monkeys performed a trace-
conditioning task in which the reinforce-
ment predicted by two CSs reversed
many times within an experiment (Fig-
ure 1A). The two CSs were computer-generated fractal patterns novel to the monkey in each session.
On every trial, monkeys fixated and viewed one CS or the other.
In the initial block of trials, CS1 predicted delivery of a liquid
reward US after a trace interval; no reinforcement followed
CS2. The reinforcement contingencies of CS1 and CS2 switched
simultaneously and without warning multiple times in every
experiment. This created two types of blocks of trials, one where
CS1 was rewarded and the other where CS2 was rewarded. We
defined context as the block of trials in which a particular set of
stimulus-outcome contingencies is in effect. Context was explic-
itly signaled by a visual cue on the first trial of a block switch and
in a random subset of trials within the blocks; overall, this cue ap-
peared throughout the experiment on 40% of trials.
We assessed monkeys’ reward expectation by measuring
anticipatory licking in the last 500 ms of the trace interval. Mon-
keys consistently showed higher levels of anticipatory licking on
rewarded trials than on non-rewarded ones (Figure 1B). Neither
the presence of the contextual cue nor how recently a contextual
cue appeared had a significant impact on the monkey’s propen-
sity to anticipate reinforcement correctly (Figure S1).
Behavioral Evidence of an Abstract Internal
Representation of Context
Behavioral evidence indicates that monkeys inferred the rein-
forcement expected from a CS viewed for the first time after a
context switch, so long as they had first viewed the other
switched CS. Figure 2A shows the average licking rate on the
first trial in which CSB appears after a block switch as a function
of the number of CSA trials experienced since the block switch
(where CSA is the first CS shown in the new context and CSB
is the other CS). Anticipatory licking upon viewing CSB changed
significantly after experiencing one or more instances of CSA,
regardless of whether in the new block CSB predicted reward
or not. Crucially, this analysis excluded CSB trials in which the
contextual cue appeared, so themonkeys had to rely on an inter-
nal representation of the context to adjust licking. These results
were observed for both monkeys, and results were similar on tri-
als containing the contextual cue.
Figure 2. Behavioral Evidence that Monkeys Utilize Abstract Representations of Context
(A) Mean licking rate on the first CS B trial after a block switch as a function of the number of CS A trials experienced since the block transition, where A and B are
the two CSs of the task. Block transition is represented by dashed vertical line and squares represent the value of the licking rate for CS B on its last occurrence
before the transition. The CS that is rewarded or non-rewarded after the block transition is indicated by + or 0 superscript, respectively. Error bars: SEM. Asterisks:
significant difference between two consecutive data points (p < 1010, Wilcoxon rank-sum test). The color code is conserved for a given CS before and after the
transition. Error bars for pre-transition values are smaller than symbols.
(B) Mean licking rate in response to the CS that changes from non-rewarded to rewarded (left, red) and from rewarded to non-rewarded (right, blue) as a function
of trials from the ‘‘behavioral switch,’’ defined as the first rewarded trial after the block transition in which the monkey’s anticipatory licking is high (left) or as the
first non-rewarded trial in which the licking is low (right) (see Experimental Procedures). Themean licking rate on the trial of the behavioral switch is represented by
a square. Error bars: SEM. Error bar on trial 0 is smaller than symbol.
(C) Distribution of lengths of exploration phases for all blocks of all sessions.We define the exploration phase as the set of trials between the beginning of the block
and the first non-rewarded trial in which the monkeys decreased their licking (see Experimental Procedures). Histogram was truncated at 10 for visual clarity.
Mean ± SD = 3.3 ± 3.2 trials. See also Figure S2.The monkeys’ performance on this task did not derive from
their having extensive experience viewing the two CSs in each
context. The CSs were novel in each experiment, and restricting
the analysis to the first block transition of each experiment
showed that on average monkeys utilize inference on the
very first context switch (p < 0.05,Wilcoxon rank-sum test). Mon-
keys were therefore able to generalize their knowledge of task
structure immediately to CS-US combinations never experi-
enced previously. This knowledge was utilized to infer expected
reinforcement.
The capacity to employ inference indicates that monkeys
possess an abstract understanding of the nature of the contexts
in this task. Consistent with this, once monkeys changed their
licking rates upon viewing a CS after a block change, they did
so in a switch-like fashion. Figure 2B shows the mean licking
rate around a block switch for the CS that becomes rewarded
(left) and for the CS that becomes non-rewarded (right) aligned
to the first trial where licking rate switched. This event marks a
sharp transition between, roughly, the two asymptotic levels of
licking. On average, for the newly rewarded CS the switch in
licking rate occurred on the very first trial, but for a newly unre-
warded CS, the switch in behavior appeared after a variable
number of trials.
On one or more trials immediately after a block switch, mon-
keys thus licked regardless of the contingencies. We label
such trials immediately after the block switch as ‘‘exploration’’
trials. On average, 3.3 exploration trials occurred after block
switches (Figure 2C). Both monkeys exited the exploration
phase abruptly, often only having experienced one of the CSs.
They then switched to the behavioral mode corresponding to
the current context in which licking reflected the reinforcement
contingencies of both CSs. Exploration has been described pre-
viously as resulting from switches in the rule linking cues and
reward (Quilodran et al., 2008) or cues and operant responses
(Fusi et al., 2007).Single Neurons in the Prefrontal Cortex and Amygdala
Encode All Task-Relevant Variables
We recorded the activity of 527 individual neurons in the prefron-
tal cortex and amygdala in two monkeys while they performed
our task (Figure 3). Of these, 187 cells (97 and 90 in eachmonkey)
were recorded in OFC, 160 cells (84 and 76) were recorded in
ACC, and 180 cells (77 and 103) were recorded in the amygdala.
The inference demonstrated by monkeys relies on their knowing
the CS identity and the current context to compute expected
reinforcement, suggesting that the brain must represent this
information. Many PFC neurons encoded context, CS identity,
and reinforcement expectation (Figures 4A–4F). All three of these
variables, including the parameter ‘‘context,’’ were also encoded
in the amygdala (Figures 4G–4I). For example, the amygdala
neuron in Figure 4G showed increased activity during context
1 relative to context 2 even though only trials that lacked a
contextual cue were used to plot these data.
We used a linear regression model to determine whether each
neuron recorded encoded CS identity, context, or reinforcement
expectation (see Experimental Procedures). Approximately 20%
of neurons in each brain area encoded context (p < 0.05, Fig-
ure 4J). CS identity was also encoded in all three brain areas,
though the amygdala contained significantly more neurons se-
lective for this parameter (p < 0.01, z test, Figure 4K). Reinforce-
ment expectation was the most frequently encoded variable in
neurons from each of the three brain areas (Figure 4L).
Population-Level Decoding of Task-Relevant Variables
Single cells often had different types of selectivity in different time
windows, such as, for example, context selectivity during the fix-
ation interval and reinforcement expectation selectivity during the
trace interval (Figures 4A and 4D). The population of cells encod-
ingaparticular trial featurewas therefore not necessarily identical
at two different time points within a trial. Given this, we examined
the encoding of task-relevant signals as a function of time byNeuron 87, 869–881, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 871
Figure 3. Recording Locations
The location of each recorded neuron is indicated
by a + symbol on the corresponding coronal slice.
Blue: OFC neurons; purple: ACC; green: amyg-
dala. Anterior-posterior coordinate of each slice is
specified relative to the inter-aural (IA) plane. Di-
agrams were constructed from anatomical MRIs
of each subject.considering populations of neurons collectively (see e.g., Rigotti
et al., 2013). A linear decoderwas trained to read out trial features
from the spike counts of the populations of neurons recorded in
each brain area. This approach combines information from the
entire population of neurons, including neurons that demonstrate
mixed selectivity, defined as selectivity to specific combinations
of trial features (e.g., CS1 in context 1 only) (Rigotti et al., 2013).
The decoder accuracy provides a single summary statistic that
quantifies how accurately the whole neuronal population repre-
sents information about any particular variable. This decoding
accuracy reflects themean difference in population spike counts
between two conditions, relative to the variance of population872 Neuron 87, 869–881, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.spike counts. These spike counts are first
averaged over the population by weight-
ing each neuron according to the weight
parameters found by training the decoder
to discriminate maximally between two
conditions (see Experimental Proce-
dures). Figure S3 shows the relation be-
tween theweight assigned toeachneuron
by the decoding algorithm and the coeffi-
cients found by fitting our linear regres-
sion model to each neuron.
We used the decoder to compare and
contrast the encoding of task-relevant
variables within and between brain areas.
The decoder was trained and tested on
the same number of cells for each area
(see Experimental Procedures). In our
task, CS identity and context may be
conceptualized as ‘‘inputs’’ needed to
compute expected reinforcement, which
is the ‘‘output’’ signal needed to direct
behavior. Figure 5A plots cross-validated
decoding accuracy for context and CS
identity as a function of time on trials in
which monkeys’ behavior anticipated the
reinforcement correctly (‘‘Correct trials’’).
The observed context selectivity was not
based upon neural responses to visual
contextual cues, as this analysis excluded
trials in which a contextual cue appeared.
Moreover, if the decoder was trained on a
subset of trials that did not contain a
contextual cue and then tested on held-
out trials that did or did not contain a
contextual cue, the decoding of context
was almost the same regardless ofwhether a contextual cue appeared (Figure S4). The context en-
coding therefore is not stimulus driven but instead reflects the
monkeys’ internal representation of context, an internal cognitive
variable that was present in the amygdala aswell as in PFC. Rein-
forcement expectation, the presumed output of the neural
computation mediating task performance, also was encoded by
neural representations in all three brain areas (Figure 5B), consis-
tentwithprior observations (Cai andPadoa-Schioppa, 2012;Ken-
nerley et al., 2011;Morrison et al., 2011;Niki andWatanabe, 1979;
Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006; Paton et al., 2006).
Neural representations of CS identity and context should
become apparent at latencies as short or shorter than
Figure 4. Single Neurons in OFC, ACC, and the Amygdala Encode Context, CS Identity, and Reinforcement Expectation
(A–C) Example OFC cells encoding context (A), CS identity (B), and reinforcement expectation of reward or no reward (C). Each plot is a peristimulus time
histogram (PSTH) aligned on CS onset.
(D–F) Example neurons from ACC.
(G–I) Example neurons from amygdala. For all plots, fixation is acquired 1 s before CS onset. PSTHs of example context-selective neurons exclude trials where
the contextual cue was shown. By convention, CS1 is the stimulus that is paired with reward in Context 1. Thus, blue solid lines and red dashed lines both
correspond to rewarded trials (indicated by + symbol), while red solid lines and blue dashed lines both correspond to non-rewarded trials (0 symbol). Vertical
dashed lines represent, in order, CS onset, CS offset, and US onset. Black arrows show where in the trial the specified feature is encoded.
(J–L) Proportion of neurons in each brain area that significantly encode context (J), CS identity (K), and reinforcement expectation (L) as determined by linear
regression analysis (Experimental Procedures). Asterisks indicate significant differences in proportions (*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, z test for different proportions). Error
bars indicate the estimated SE of each proportion based on a binomial distribution.representations of reinforcement expectation to support the
computation underlying task performance. Decoding perfor-
mance for context was significantly above the 50% chance
level (95% confidence intervals, bootstrap) in amygdala, OFC,
and ACC, commencing shortly after fixation point onset, long
before reinforcement expectation was encoded. We determined
whether CS identity signals also emerged fast enough to account
for the computation of reinforcement expectation. Two linear de-
coders were trained to read out CS identity and reinforcement
expectation with greater temporal precision during the 500-ms
time window starting 100 ms after CS onset in which decoding
performance for reinforcement expectation transitioned from
chance level to nearly 100% (shaded area, Figures 5A and 5B).
In the amygdala, the CS identity signal appeared significantly
earlier than the reinforcement expectation signal (p < 0.05, boot-
strap; Figure 5C). In OFC and ACC, the CS identity signal became
significantly greater than chance levels at about the same time as
the reinforcement expectation signal (p > 0.05, bootstrap; Fig-
ure 5C). The CS identity signal appears in the amygdala signifi-
cantly earlier than it does in OFC and ACC (p < 103 for both,bootstrap). Overall, CS identity and context informationwere pre-
sent as early as or earlier than information about reinforcement
expectation in all three brain areas, a requirement if these signals
are being utilized to perform the task.
We next determined whether context and CS identity were
encoded on trials where monkeys demonstrated inference un-
equivocally (i.e., in the first non-rewarded CSB trial after a block
switch) (Figure 2A). Neural activity was analyzed during the
500-ms period where the reinforcement expectation signal
emerges (100–600 ms after CS onset, shading in Figures 5A
and 5B). The amygdala, OFC, and ACC all encoded context
and CS identity (Figure 6A), indicating that the required signals
were present when monkeys demonstrated inference. All three
brain areas also signaled expected reinforcement accurately
on these trials (Figure 6B).
Neural Signals Encoding Context Reflect Cognitive
Abstraction
The use of inference indicates that monkeys knew the sets of
CS-US associations that defined the two contexts. We thereforeNeuron 87, 869–881, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 873
Figure 5. Population-Level Encoding of
Context and CS Identity Occurs Fast
Enough to Account for the Correct Anticipa-
tion of Reinforcement
(A) Performance of the linear decoder at reading
out two task-relevant trial variables, context, and
CS identity during ‘‘correct’’ trials (defined in the
Experimental Procedures). These variables could
be used as ‘‘inputs’’ to a neural computation of
expected reinforcement. The decoding accuracy
was computed on a 250-ms sliding window step-
ped every 50 ms across the trial for the three brain
areas separately: blue, OFC; purple, ACC; green,
amygdala. The number of cells from each popu-
lation used in the decoder was equalized for
comparisons across areas (see Experimental
Procedures). Shaded areas indicate 95% confi-
dence intervals (bootstrap). Vertical dashed lines
represent CS onset and earliest possible US onset.
Grey shaded area corresponds to 500-ms window
from 100 to 600 ms after CS onset used in sub-
sequent analyses.
(B) Performance of the linear decoder at reading
out reinforcement expectation, the output of a
neural computation mediating task performance.
(C) Relative timing between the CS identity signal
(blue) and the reinforcement expectation signal
(black) in OFC, ACC, and the amygdala. The per-
formance of the linear decoder was computed on a
50-ms sliding window stepped every 5 ms across
the 500-ms time window shown in (A) and (B) (shaded area). Vertical dashed lines and corresponding labels indicate the first time bin where the decoding
performance is significantly above chance level and remains above it for the ten subsequent time bins. Shaded areas around chance level indicate 95%
confidence intervals for the decoding performances when the two trial types (CS1 and CS2 or reward and no reward) were randomly labeled. See also Figures S3
and S4.hypothesized that the observed neural representations of
context reflect the process of abstraction that links together
the pairs of CS-US associations within each context. In this
case, the representation of context should be similar following
both types of CS-US pairs (i.e., both trial types) that appear
within a context. Alternatively, neurons might merely represent
a memory of the CS-US pairing from the previous trial. In this
case, decoding performance for context could be above chance,
since each CS-US pair appears only in one of the two contexts.
However, in this scenario, the signal on trials following different
CS-US pairs would not necessarily be similar.
We performed an analysis to determine whether the observed
neural representations reflect the linked sets of CS-US associa-
tions defining each context or instead the memory trace of the
CS-US pair that appeared on the previous trial. The linear
decoder was trained to decode context on trials preceded by
two CS-US pairs belonging to different contexts (CS1 and CS2
when they were rewarded). We then tested whether one could
decode context on trials preceded by the other two CS-US pair-
ings (non-rewarded CS1 and CS2). If context can be correctly
decoded, then the neural representations observed in the two
types of trials of the same context must have something in com-
mon, which would indicate that CS1-Reward and CS2-NoRe-
ward trial types, defining context 1, are linked together in the
neural representation. Analogously, CS1-NoReward and CS2-
Reward trials, which define context 2, would also be linked
together.874 Neuron 87, 869–881, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.Context was decoded significantly at above chance levels in
all three brain areas during the 500-ms epoch immediately
before responses to CSs begin (Figure 6C). The analysis was
performed on trials that did not contain a contextual cue, so de-
coding could not have been based on a response to the contex-
tual cue on the current trial. Moreover, the decoding of context
was not related to the outcome of the preceding trials, since
the decoder was tested on trials that followed two trial types
with the same reinforcement outcome. Finally, the decoding of
context was not due to the CS identity of the preceding trials,
since CS1 was categorized as context 1 during training and
context 2 during testing. Decoding context based on the CS
identity of the previous trial would therefore produce an incorrect
categorization. This analysis rules out the possibility that the de-
coding of context can merely be attributed to signals that reflect
a memory trace of the CS-US association of the previous trial.
The data indicate that the context signal instead reflects the
linked sets of CS-US associations within each context.
The Neural Representation of Context during
Exploration and Error Trials
If neural encoding in OFC, ACC, and/or the amygdala underlies
the behavior that reflects the animal’s reward expectation, an
alteration in encoding should be apparent when licking behavior
does not predict reinforcement accurately. We therefore exam-
ined the relationship between neural representations and perfor-
mance by separating trials into three types: exploration, error,
Figure 6. Context and CS Identity Signals Are Present during Inference and Reflect the Linked Sets of CS-US Associations that Define
Context
(A) Decoding performance for context and CS identity on trials where subjects correctly inferred reinforcement expectation, as revealed by their licking behavior,
on the first non-rewarded trial following one or more rewarded trials after a block switch. Neural activity was taken during the 500-ms time window shown starting
100 ms after CS onset. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals (bootstrap).
(B) Decoding performance for reinforcement expectation on the same trials as in (A).
(C) Decoding performance for context on trials following non-rewarded trials (CS1 and CS2) for a decoder trained on trials following rewarded trials (CS1+ and
CS2+). Neural activity was analyzed during a time window extending from 400 ms before CS onset to 100 ms after CS appearance on trials without a contextual
cue; this window ends before CS-related responses commence. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals (bootstrap).and correct trials (Table S1). We trained the decoder to read out
CS identity and context in a subset of correct trials, and we
asked if using the decoder weightings established on correct tri-
als would demonstrate reduced decoding accuracy on explora-
tion and error trials. Training and testing were done in the time
window where the reinforcement expectation signal emerges
on correct trials (100–600 ms after CS onset). Both context and
CS identity could be decoded with maximum accuracy within
this time epoch on correct trials (Figure 5A).
The encoding of CS identity remained strong during explora-
tion phase and error trials in all three brain areas (Figure 7A).
Exploration phase and error trial behavior therefore appear un-
likely to arise from an incorrect representation of CS identity. In
contrast, a weakened representation of context could be res-
ponsible for exploration phase behavior: decoding accuracy of
context was near chance levels and significantly reduced in all
three brain areas (p < 0.05, bootstrap, Figure 7B). On error trials,
only the decoding of context in the amygdala decreased signifi-
cantly to chance level (p < 0.01, bootstrap, Figure 7B). The de-
coding performance for context information in OFC and ACC
on error trials was not statistically different from correct trials
(p > 0.05, bootstrap). The amygdala exhibited a larger difference
in decoding accuracy on correct versus error trials than either
OFC or ACC (p < 0.01, Wilcoxon rank-sum test) (Figure 7C).
The decreased decoding performance for context in the amyg-
dala appeared to be due to a failure to maintain this representa-
tion during the CS interval. Decoding accuracy for context during
the time epoch preceding responses to the CS was significantly
above chance in all three brain areas (Figure S5).
Wenext sought tounderstandwhether theobserveddecreased
decoding performance for context was due to decreased sig-
nal, increased noise, or both. As described above, training the
decoder to discriminate between contexts during correct trials
furnishes a weight for each neuron. These weights are used
to compute a weighted sum of the activity of the neurons within
a given population (see Experimental Procedures and Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures sections entitled ‘‘Definition
and quantification of encoding signal’’), which then determines
the decision of the decoder. We computed this weighted sum
within the same time interval as in Figure 7B (0.1–0.6 ms afterCS presentation). The mean difference between the weighted
sum of spike counts in context 1 and context 2 trials provides
a measure of context selectivity, which we label as the ‘‘context
encoding signal’’ (Figure 8A). Analogously, the variance of the
weighted average sum of spike counts (the ‘‘context encoding
variance’’) was computed during the same timeepoch on correct,
exploration, and error trials (Figure 8B).
The decreased decoding of context during exploration trials in
all three brain areas, and during error trials in the amygdala, re-
flected a diminished strength of the context encoding signal
within the neuronal populations rather than an increase in the
variance (Figure 8). On exploration trials, the context-encoding
signal decreased significantly as compared to correct trials in
all three brain areas (p < 0.01, bootstrap) (Figure 8A). On error tri-
als, the context signal decreased significantly compared to cor-
rect trials only in the amygdala (p < 0.01, bootstrap) (Figure 8A),
where the signal was not significantly above chance levels. By
contrast, the variance of the context signal—a measure of noise
due to neural variability—did not exhibit a significant change be-
tween correct, exploration, and error trials in any brain area
(Figure 8B).
The Neural Representation of Reinforcement
Expectation during Exploration and Error Trials
The inconsistent licking behavior observed during exploration
and error trials also correlated with a reduced encoding of rein-
forcement expectation during the trace interval. In the 1-s time
window preceding the US, performance of the population
decoder during both the exploration phase and error trials
decreased relative to correct trials in all three neural populations
(p < 0.01, bootstrap) (Figure 9). Although reduced, decoding ac-
curacy for reinforcement expectation remained significantly
above chance (or, for OFC during exploration trials, significantly
below chance level, suggesting a persistence of the CS-US as-
sociations from the previous block). This result was qualitatively
identical when performing this analysis in the same 500-ms win-
dow used for the CS identity and context signals. We do not
know why monkeys fail to exploit the weakened, though still pre-
sent, representation of reinforcement expectation in order to not
make errors in anticipatory behavior. It is possible that neuralNeuron 87, 869–881, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 875
Figure 7. Neural Correlates of Correct,
Exploration, and Error Behavior: Decoder
Analyses
Comparison of neural encoding of the two task-
relevant trial features between correct trials,
exploration-phase trials, and error trials in the
500-ms time window starting 100 ms after CS
onset (shaded area in Figures 5A and 5B).
(A) CS identity signal.
(B) Context signal. Left: OFC. Middle: ACC. Right:
amygdala. The number of trials used in the
decoder was equalized across correct, explora-
tion, and error conditions for comparison pur-
poses (see Experimental Procedures). Error
bars indicate 95% confidence intervals (boot-
strap). Horizontal, dotted line indicates chance
level. Asterisks indicate significant differences in performance between conditions. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, bootstrap.
(C) Distribution of the differences in the decoding performance for context information between correct and error trials for OFC, ACC, and the amygdala. The
distributions were generated by repeated partitioning of the trials into training and testing sets (Experimental Procedures). See also Figure S5.activity in brain regions downstream from the amygdala, OFC,
and ACC exhibit a total lack of reinforcement expectation encod-
ing on error trials.
DISCUSSION
Emotions often arise upon seeing a stimulus associated with
looming reinforcement. Adaptive emotional behavior requires
brain mechanisms that regulate such emotions using cognitive
operations. Here, monkeys performed a trace-conditioning
task in which the sets of CS-US associations reversed many
times for two CSs, creating two task sets, or contexts. Monkeys
used an internal representation of context to infer that the rein-
forcement contingencies of one CS had switched if they had first
experienced the other CS-US pair after a reversal (Figure 2A).
This inference led to an abrupt and persistent behavioral transi-
tion, reflected by anticipatory licking switching in one trial to
asymptotic levels (Figure 2B). Behavioral adjustment in this
task therefore appeared to be supported by a rapid switch-like
activation of the internal representation of the current context
(Rigotti et al., 2010). Remarkably, this even occurred on the first
block switch of each session, before monkeys had experienced
each CS in both contexts.
Neurophysiological recordings in the amygdala, OFC, and
ACC revealed that all three brain areas provide a neural repre-
sentation of cognitive context, or task set. This signal was pre-
sent on trials that lacked contextual sensory cues (Figures 4
and 5) and in which monkeys used inference to adjust their
anticipatory behavior (Figure 6A). The context signal reflected a
process of abstraction that linked the set of CS-US associations
defining each context (Figure 6C). The PFC has traditionally
been proposed to provide a cognitive map of task space (O’Re-
illy, 2010; Wilson et al., 2014), a signal related to what we
observed. The amygdala has not traditionally been described
as playing this role in mediating behavior. The representation
of cognitive context in the amygdala was strongly coupled to
accurate reinforcement prediction (Figures 7B and 8A). These
data suggest that during cognitive regulation, the amygdala
actively participates in the maintenance of cognitively relevant
information.876 Neuron 87, 869–881, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.Neural Correlates of Exploration
Immediately after a block switch, which was always signaled by
a contextual cue, monkeys tended to lick on the first trial of the
new block, and this default strategy could continue for a few tri-
als. We refer to this behavior as ‘‘exploratory,’’ and it appears to
compete with the strategy to employ inference based on knowl-
edge of the task structure. Exploration involves an active sam-
pling of the environment (Quilodran et al., 2008) and can arise
from a mismatch between predictions about reward and envi-
ronmental feedback (Cohen et al., 2007). Licking in response
to a CS in our task is necessary to collect reward, and it is one
way a monkey can sample the environment to determine if a
CS is rewarded. In our experiments, we classified trials as
belonging to an exploratory phase using a behavioral criterion
(Figure 2C). Context encoding decreased dramatically in the
amygdala, OFC, and ACCon these trials (Figure 7B), which could
be attributed to a decrease in signal rather than an increase in
noise (Figure 8). The decreased signal could arise from the fact
that the exploration strategy does not require the active re-
expression of abstract information about context.
Humans also exhibit exploratory phases, and the presence of
such strategies can be adaptive. For example, if one uses a task
that contains three or more contexts, or if a task employs unre-
liable feedback, immediate switching becomes impossible,
and exploration is necessary to figure out the new context
(Koechlin, 2014; Yu and Dayan, 2005) (also see Collins and
Koechlin, 2012; Donoso et al., 2014) (these papers refer to a
context as a ‘‘task set’’). Exploration is also an important compo-
nent of optimal behavior when new contexts are occasionally
introduced. Humans tend to adopt the same strategy whether
contexts are recurrent or new, even though learning new con-
texts is significantly more challenging (Collins and Koechlin,
2012). Thus, subjects tend to use a strategy that is optimal for
the most difficult situations, which may be encountered more
often in the real world, even though this strategy may be sub-
optimal for simpler cases.
Neural Correlates of Errors
Once monkeys exit the exploratory phase, their anticipatory
licking predicts whether a trial is rewarded or not with high
Figure 8. A Decrease in Encoding Signal,
Not an Increase in Noise, Accounts for the
Lower Decoding Accuracy of Context
(A) Context encoding signal, defined as the
weighted sum (across neurons) of the mean dif-
ference in neural activity on context 1 and context
2 trials, is plotted for each brain area on correct,
exploration, and error trials. The weighted sum
uses the weights from the decoder procedure (see
Experimental Procedures; Supplemental Experi-
mental Procedures). The context encoding signal
is computed in the same time interval used in
Figure 7B (0.1–0.6 ms after CS presentation). The
drops in context encoding signal are consistent
with the decreases in decoding accuracy in Fig-
ure 7B. Error bars indicate 95% confidence in-
tervals (bootstrap). Grey asterisks inside bars
indicate a significant context encoding signal.
Black asterisks indicate significant differences
between correct and exploration or error trials. *p <
0.05; **p < 0.01 (bootstrap).
(B) The variance in the encoding of context is plotted for each brain area during correct, exploration, and error trials from the same time epoch as in (A). The
context encoding variance is ameasure of the variability of the context encoding signal quantified as the sample variance of the difference of theweighted sums of
neural activity between context 1 and context 2 trials. The context encoding variance does not show a significant change between correct, exploration, and error
trials in any brain area (p > 0.05 for all comparisons, bootstrap).probability. Occasionally, however, monkeys either lick on a
non-rewarded trial or they do not lick on a rewarded trial. In
the amygdala, but not in OFC or ACC, we observed a significant
decrease in the decoding performance of our linear decoder for
the context signal on error trials during CS presentation (Fig-
ure 7B). Further analysis revealed that this drop in decoding
accuracy could be attributed to a loss in encoding signal, as in-
dexed by changes in mean firing rates, and not to an increase in
noise, as indexed by increases in firing rate variance (Figure 8).
Previous studies have also noted that activity in PFC represent-
ing abstract rules does not differ on correct compared to error
trials (Mansouri et al., 2006).
Conceivably, the observed decrease in performance accuracy
for decoding context could have resulted from a change in the
encoding scheme on error trials rather than from a loss of context
information. We consider this unlikely because the linear classi-
fier successfully decoded context before the CS presentation on
error trials (Figure S5). The change in encoding scheme would
therefore have to occur abruptly during error trials, an unlikely
scenario. In general, our approach postulates that the perfor-
mance of a linear decoder is a proxy for the information that
can be decoded by a local downstream circuit. We assume
that brain structures downstream to the areas we have studied
are tuned to the encoding scheme utilized during correct trials,
which are the trials we train the decoder on. It seems unlikely
that these downstream areas can instantaneously adapt to arbi-
trary codes on error trials.
Comparison with Studies of Context-Dependent
Modulation of Behavior and Neural Activity
The neural representation of cognitive context emerges in the
amygdala, OFC, and ACC before a CS appears and then is sus-
tained during CS presentation, even when context is not cued by
a sensory stimulus. We showed that this neural signal encodes
the task set that defines a context by training a linear decoderto decode context on trials following two CS-US trial types,
one from each of the two contexts, and then successfully
decoding context on trials following the other two CS-US trial
types (Figure 6C). The neural representations of the pairs of
CS-US associations that define each context are thereby linked.
This representation reflects a process of cognitive abstraction
connecting together the sets of associations that define each
context.
The method through which we define and establish context
in our experiments differs from prior studies investigating con-
textual fear-conditioning or context-specific extinction. In those
studies, contexts are typically defined by a set of sensory stimuli
appearing during presentation of a CS (Hobin et al., 2003; Maren
et al., 2013; Orsini et al., 2013); these paradigms do not require
the brain to activate an internal, uncued representation of
context to respond appropriately. As a result, those paradigms
likely invoke distinct brain mechanisms from those investigated
here.
Studies that employ explicit sensory cues to signal context
have suggested that the hippocampus represents this informa-
tion (Anderson and Jeffery, 2003; Hayman et al., 2003; Holland
and Bouton, 1999). By contrast, the amygdala has been found
to play a critical role in forming and storing associative links be-
tween contexts (or cues) and reinforcing stimuli (Maren and
Quirk, 2004; Maren et al., 2013). Consistent with this view,
context-dependent modulation of responses to sensory stimuli
predicting reinforcement have previously been reported in the
amygdala (Bermudez and Schultz, 2010; Hirai et al., 2009; Hobin
et al., 2003; Orsini et al., 2013) and elsewhere when animals un-
dergo context-specific extinction (Bouton and Todd, 2014;Milad
and Quirk, 2012; Orsini et al., 2013). The neural responses
described in those studies could be related to changes in the
subjective valuation of a CS depending upon context. For
example, during context-specific extinction, a subject learns
that a CS no longer predicts aversive stimulus delivery in oneNeuron 87, 869–881, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 877
Figure 9. Representation of Reinforcement
Expectation during Correct, Exploration,
and Error Trials
Comparison of neural encoding of reinforcement
expectation between correct trials, exploration-
phase trials, and error trials in the 1-s time window
preceding the US delivery. Besides the time win-
dow used, methodology and conventions are the
same as in Figure 7.context. In a different context, the CS is not extinguished, so it
still can elicit an emotional response. The observed context-
dependent modulation of responses to a CS therefore could
reflect the differential associative meaning of the CSs in each
context, and not context per se.
The neural signals reflecting reinforcement expectation in our
study correspond to the inferred value of a CS (Stalnaker et al.,
2014), a context-dependent response that is the output of the
computation that underlies monkeys’ performance. By contrast,
neural signals representing CS identity and context are the input
signals required to perform inference. The neural representations
of cognitive context in the amygdala, OFC, and ACC are there-
fore fundamentally different, both in their nature and in their
computational role, from prior observations of context-depen-
dent modulations of neural activity in response to a CS.
Our task design bears resemblance to occasion setting tasks
in which there is not a one-to-one mapping of a CS onto a US
(Schmajuk and Holland, 1998). In these tasks, the interpretation
of a CS depends upon the stimuli that ‘‘set the occasion’’ for the
CS presentation. The hippocampus, and perhaps related struc-
tures like the rhinal cortices, are likely important for occasion
setting (Holland et al., 1999; Yoon et al., 2011). These structures
are interconnected with the amygdala (Stefanacci et al., 1996).
Two aspects of our study distinguish it from typical occasion
setting investigations. First, 60% of trials in our task did not
contain a contextual cue (the equivalent of an occasion setter),
and information about the current context had to be represented
internally across trials. Second, monkeys exhibited inference on
our task, which has not typically been reported during studies of
occasion setting in rodent models. Thus, our task probably en-
gages distinct neural mechanisms from those revealed during
studies of occasion setting.
Neural Representations of Cognitive Context for RL
Algorithms
Recent influential work has suggested that goal-directed
learning is instantiated by model-based RL algorithms in which
an agent estimates state values by implementing a ‘‘cognitive
search’’ procedure over an internal model of the environment
(Daw, 2012; Daw et al., 2005; Doya, 1999; Rangel et al., 2008;
Redish et al., 2008). This proposal is empirically supported by
trial-by-trial fitting procedures that reveal high correlation be-
tween BOLD signals and the variables of model-based RL algo-
rithms (Daw, 2011). A recent study shows that BOLD signals in
the amygdala representing value and precision may be better
correlated with model-based, as compared to model-free, algo-
rithms on a Pavlovian serial reversal task (Pre´vost et al., 2013).878 Neuron 87, 869–881, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.Our data are compatible with the notion that the amygdala
might contribute to model-based RL, since the abstraction of
cognitive variables corresponding to the states of an internal rep-
resentation of the environment is a necessary premise for model-
based computation. Furthermore, since monkeys adjusted their
behavior by using inference, a process that cannot be explained
in terms of re-learning changed CS-US contingencies, their
behavior would not be captured by themodel-free RL algorithms
considered by Pre´vost et al. (2013). We emphasize, however,
that once neural representations of internal states corresponding
to external hidden variables like context are available, an agent
might mimic goal-directed instrumental responses by imple-
menting a reactive habitual policy over these internal states
(Gershman et al., 2010; Redish et al., 2007; Rigotti et al., 2010).
In this case, the agent would not need to perform an explicit
search process. Our study does not determine which of these
two algorithms—a model-based search over an internal repre-
sentation of the environment or a reactive policy over internal
states—accounts for how inference is implemented. Instead,
we demonstrate the existence of a neural representation of the
element that is common to both strategies: the abstraction and
representation of an internal cognitive variable in amygdala,
OFC, and ACC.
Traditional views of amygdala function have held that the
amygdala learns about the motivational significance of stimuli
so as to coordinate emotional responses (LeDoux, 2000) but
have not ascribed to it a role in the maintenance of abstract
cognitive information. The conceptual framework instead sug-
gested by our data posits that representations of abstract infor-
mation in the amygdala may play an important role in supporting
computations of reinforcement expectation, thereby enabling
subjects to respond flexibly to stimuli whose meaning differs de-
pending upon the situation.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Animals and Behavioral Task
Two rhesusmonkeys (Macacamulatta; one female, 5 kg; onemale, 10 kg) were
used in these experiments. All experimental procedures were in accordance
with the National Institutes of Health guide for the care and use of laboratory
animals and the Animal Care and Use Committees at New York State Psychi-
atric Institute and Columbia University. Methods are described in further detail
in the Supplemental Experimental Procedures.
Monkeys performed a serial-reversal trace-conditioning task in which they
were presented one of two novel CSs (fractal patterns) for 0.35 s (monkey V)
or for 0.15 s (monkey C). A shorter CS presentation was used for monkey C
to prevent systematic fixation breaks upon seeing the non-rewarded CS. After
a 1.5 s trace epoch, either a liquid reward US or nothing was delivered depend-
ing uponwhich CS had appeared. Rewarded and non-rewarded trials followed
a pseudo-random schedule. The association between CS and US depended
on the context in which the trial occurred. In Context 1, CS1 was paired with
reward and CS2 was paired with no-reward; in Context 2 the associations
were reversed. Blocks were randomly selected to last 30, 40, or 50 trials for
monkey V and 20, 30, or 40 trials formonkey C. Context 1 andContext 2 blocks
alternated 12–30 times during experiments. A contextual cue consisting of a
color frame (Context 1, yellow; Context 2, blue) at the periphery of the screen
appeared from fixation point onset until the end of the trace epoch on the first
trial of a new block and overall on 40% of trials randomly selected.
Behavioral Measures
Anticipatory licking behavior was measured by detecting the interruption of an
infrared laser beam passing between the monkey’s lips and the reward deliv-
ery spout. Licking rate was defined as the proportion of time spent licking dur-
ing the last 500 ms of the trace epoch. A threshold was applied to the licking
rate to separate trials with high licking from trials with low licking (Figure S6;
Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
We defined the exploration phase as the set of trials at the beginning of a
block that ends on the trial preceding the first non-rewarded trial in which
the monkey’s licking rate was below threshold (Table S1). We defined error tri-
als as trials after the exploration phase in a block in which the binary licking rate
(reflecting monkey’s reward expectation) did not match the reinforcement
delivered at the end of the trial (i.e., licking in a non-rewarded trial or not licking
in a rewarded trial). Correct trials were defined as non-error trials outside of
exploration phases.
Electrophysiological Recordings
In each session, we individually advanced up to eight tungsten electrodes into
the three brain areas (one to four to each area; impedance2MU; FHC Instru-
ments) using a motorized multi-electrode drive (NAN Instruments). Analog sig-
nals were amplified, band-pass filtered (250 Hz–8 kHz), and digitized (40 kHz)
using a PlexonMAP system (Plexon, Inc.). Single units were isolated offline us-
ing Plexon Offline Sorter. Recording sites in OFC were located between the
medial orbital sulcus and the lateral orbital sulcus (Brodmann areas 13 m
and 13l). Recording sites in ACC were in the ventral bank of the ACC sulcus
(area 24c). Amygdala recordings were largely in the basolateral complex.
Data Analysis
Linear Regression Analysis
We fitted the firing rate of each cell with the following linear regression model:
FR=a+ b1
US+ b2
CTXT+ b3
CS+ ε;
where US, CTXT, and CS are binary vectors representing, for each trial, the
reinforcement, the context, and the CS, respectively. a is a constant term;
b1, b2, and b3 are the coefficients; and ε is the residual error. Trials in which
the contextual cue was shown were excluded from the regression. The firing
rate was taken from three time windows: fixation interval (fixation point onset
to CS onset), CS/trace interval (CS onset to US onset), and US interval (US
onset to US onset + 0.5 s). Cells were defined as context-coding if the
CTXT term of themodel significantly explained the firing rate in any of the three
time windows (p < 0.05, t statistic with Bonferroni correction for multiple com-
parisons). Cells were defined asCS- or reinforcement-coding if the firing rate in
the CS/Trace interval was significantly explained by the CS or US terms,
respectively.
Population Decoding
Pseudo-Simultaneous Population Response Vectors. We used a population
decoding algorithm for analyzing population neural activity; details appear in
the Supplemental Information. Briefly, the algorithm was based on a population
decoder trained on pseudo-simultaneous population response vectors (Meyers
et al., 2008). The components of these vectors corresponded to the spikecounts
of the recorded neurons in specific time bins.Within each trial we aligned the ac-
tivity of neurons on CS onset and computed the spike count over time bins of
250ms (Figures 5A and 5B), 50ms (Figure 5C), 500ms (Figures 6–8), or 1 s (Fig-
ure 9) thatwedisplaced in stepsof 50ms (Figures5Aand5B) or 5ms (Figure 5C).
Given a task condition c and a time bin t (for instance, between 0 and 250ms
after CS presentation), we generated pseudo-simultaneous population res-
ponse vectors by sampling, for every neuron i, the z-scored spike count in atrial in condition c, which we indicate by nci(t). This procedure resulted in the
single trial population response vector nc(t) = (nc1(t), n
c
2(t),., n
c
N(t)), where N
is the number of recorded neurons in the area under consideration. We used
the same number of neurons for all areas, randomly discarding excess neurons
so that we couldmeaningful compare findings across brain areas.We also dis-
carded neurons for which we had fewer than ten trials of ‘‘correct’’ behavior in
each condition (i.e., in eachCS-US combination). In total, this analysis focused
on 143 neurons recorded in each brain area.
Training and Testing the Population Decoder. Every trial in our task was in-
dexed by one of four conditions given by the combination of CS identity (CS1
or CS2) and the reinforcement outcome (rewarded or non-rewarded). In all de-
coding analyses, we discarded trials where the contextual cue was presented,
eliminating contextual-cue selectivity as a possible explanation for apparent
context selectivity.
All decoding analyses consisted in training a population decoder to discrim-
inate between population response vectors belonging to two distinct classes
that corresponded to two sets of experimental conditions for either CS identity,
context, or expected reinforcement and then testing the performance of the
trained decoder on held-out trials in discriminating between the two classes.
The training of the decoder was always done on trials where the licking
behavior was ‘‘correct.’’ We tested decoder performance on correct, error,
and exploration trials. This allowed us to assess how the neural patterns of ac-
tivity differ between the state in which the monkey’s prediction is correct and
states in which the monkey is engaged in exploratory behavior or is incorrectly
anticipating reinforcement.
Population response vectors for training and testing were generated by
randomly sampling (with replacement) trial pools for each neuron 1,000 times.
The average decoding performance, and its statistical significance and confi-
dence intervals were estimated by repeating this procedure either 1,000
(Figures 5A and 5B) or 10,000 times (Figures 5C and 6–9) (Golland et al.,
2005). The significance of the decoding performance was determined by the
percentage of partitions yielding a performance above 0.5 (chance level). Simi-
larly, significant decreases in performance (Figure 7) were defined by the per-
centage (95% or 99%) of partitions yielding a performance difference above 0.
Definition and Quantification of Encoding Signal. The decoding algorithm
employed allowed us to quantify the signal collectively encoded in the neural
population regarding context by summing the contribution of each neuron to
the decoding performance in discriminating Context 1 and Context 2. This is
accomplished by weighting the preference (i.e., the difference in trial average
activity) of each neuron by the weight that the decoder attributes to each
neuron as a consequence of the training procedure (see the Supplemental
Experimental Procedures for details). We define the encoding signal S as the
(weighted) average preference across the population with regards to the two
conditions (Contexts 1 and 2). The encoding signal is a global measure of
the ‘‘strength’’ of the signal that our particular decoder can use in order to
discriminate between the two different contexts. Analogously to how we
compute the encoding signal S, we compute the corresponding encoding vari-
ance N, which measures the trial-to-trial variability of S (see the Supplemental
Experimental Procedures).
This method allows us to examine separately the encoding signal and the
encoding variance, both of which may contribute to decoding performance.
We could then determine whether a decrease in decoding performance be-
tween two experimental conditions is due to a decrease in signal (that quan-
tifies the neural population selectivity) or an increase in variance (that quan-
tifies the spike count variability across all neurons).
Comparison with Alternative Population Decoder Algorithms. The linear
decoder described differs little from those using a Fisher discriminant method
(Fisher, 1936). The Fisher discriminant method is equivalent to a multidimen-
sional ROC analysis on the firing rates of all neurons simultaneously and is
therefore very directly related to the activity of individual neurons. The decod-
ing accuracy simply represents differences in mean spike counts between
different conditions, averaged over the population by weighting each neuron
with the strength of its selectivity.
The linear decoder we used is also tightly linked to conventional approaches
suchas regression analysesof single unit data. FigureS3shows that the average
weight (averaged across bagging folds within one training instance; see Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures) that the trained decoder attributes to eachNeuron 87, 869–881, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 879
neuron is strongly correlatedwith the coefficient foundwhen fitting the firing rate
of each individual neuron with a simple linear regression model.
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Supplemental Information includes six figures, one table, and Supplemental
Experimental Procedures and can be found with this article online at http://
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